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Abstract. The existing analysis of the Crowds anonymity protocol assumes that
a participating member is either ‘honest’ or ‘corrupted.’ This paper generalises
this analysis so that each member is assumed to maliciously disclose the identity
of other nodes with a probability determined by her vulnerability to corruption.
Within this model, the trust in a principal is deﬁned to be the probability that she
behaves honestly. We investigate the eﬀect of such a probabilistic behaviour on
the anonymity of the principals participating in the protocol, and formulate the
necessary conditions to achieve ‘probable innocence.’ Using these conditions,
we propose a generalised Crowds-Trust protocol which uses trust information to
achieves ‘probable innocence’ for principals exhibiting probabilistic behaviour.
1 Introduction
Anonymity protocols often use random mechanisms. It is therefore natural to think
of anonymity in probabilistic terms. Various notions of such probabilistic anonymity
have been proposed and a recent line of work in the literature explores formalising
these notions through information-theoretic concepts (e.g. [1, 4–6, 12, 15, 18]). Such
approaches usually assume that participants in the protocol can be partitioned in two
classes: honest members, who always behave correctly, and attackers, who try to break
the protocol. Although a clear separation between trustworthy members and attackers
makes the analysis easier, it is not a realistic assumption for open and dynamic sys-
tems in the era of ubiquitous computing. Indeed, traditional approaches to security base
on authentication and roles are not suﬃcient in open systems. A promising approach
is to base security and privacy decisions on attributes linked to some level of trust a
principal can provide evidence for. The principals participating in a protocol will in
general have individual trust judgements; accordingly, interactions between any two of
them are governed by their mutual levels of trust. As an illustrating example, consider
the social network of F, where members can require some of their activities or
information to be accessible only to members who they explicitly accepted as friends.
This could easily (and does) give misplaced conﬁdence to F users, and encour-
ages them to share sensitive information with ‘trusted’ friends, without considering
that those friends’ security system may just be vulnerable to attacks: even though they
would not maliciously reveal a user’s privata data, friends provide diﬀerent levels of
vulnerability according to the robustness of their security systems, such as the strength
of their passwords, the quality of their anti-viruses, and so on. In other words, at eachinteraction with user i, there is a probability ti that she is not corrupted and hence acts
honestly, and a corresponding probability 1−ti that instead she is corrupted. Moreover,
between any given two interactions with a given user, her state may change from hon-
est to corrupted (e.g., as a result of being infected) and vice versa (e.g., as a result of
running an antiviral software). In this paper we postulate such probabilistic behavioural
model for principals, and investigate its eﬀect on the security of anonymity protocols
such as Reiter and Rubin’s C protocol [16].
C allows Internet users to perform anonymous web transactions by sending
their messages through a random chain of users participating in the protocol. Each user
in the ‘crowd’ establishes a path between her and a set of servers by selecting randomly
other users to act as routers. The random selection process is performed in such a way
that when a user in the path relays a message, she does not know whether or not the
sender is the initiator (or originator) of the message, or just another forwarder. Each
user only has access to messages routed through her. It is well known that C can-
not ensure strong anonymity [3, 16] in presence of corrupted participants; yet, when
the number of corrupted users is suﬃciently small, it provides a weaker notion of
anonymity known as probable innocence: informally, a sender is probably innocent
if to an attacker she is no more likely to be the originator than not to be.
This paper is to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst to investigate the impact on the
security of C of principals alternating in probabilistically between honest and
corrupt behaviours.
Related work. The research on quantitative approaches to information-hiding has re-
cently become very active and fruit-bearing. Several formal deﬁnitions and frame-
works have been proposed for reasoning about secure information ﬂow analysis (e.g.,
[7,8,19]), side-channel analysis (e.g., [13]) and anonymity. Our work follows a recent
trend in the analysis of anonymity protocols directed to the application of information-
theoreticnotions(e.g.,[1,2,4–6,9,12,15,17,18]),wherebytheworkclosertothepresent
one are those by Reiter and Ruben [16], Halpen and O’Neill [10], Chatzikokolakis and
Palamidessi [3], and a recent paper Hamadou et al [12].
In [16] the authors propose a formal deﬁnition of probable innocence predicated
over the probability of certain observable events induced by the actions of anonymous
users participating in the protocol. They require that the probability of an anonymous
user producing any observable to be less than one half. In [10] the authors formalise
probable innocence in terms of the adversary’s conﬁdence that a particular anonymous
event happened, after performing an observation. Their deﬁnition requires that the prob-
ability of an anonymous event should be at most one half, under any observation. In [3]
the authors argue that the deﬁnition of [16] makes sense only for systems satisfying cer-
tain properties, whilst the deﬁnition of [10] depends on the probabilities of anonymous
events external to the protocol. Thus they propose a deﬁnition of probable innocence
that combines both by considering both the probability of producing some observable
and the adversary’s conﬁdence after the observation.
In [12] the authors ﬁrst generalise the concepts of probable innocence and relate it to
Smith’s concept of protocol vulnerability [19]. Instead of just comparing the probability
of being innocent with the probability of being guilty, they compare such probabilities
against a parameter α. Informally, a protocol is α-probable innocent if for any anony-mous user the probability of being innocent is less than or equal to α. Then, they extend
the deﬁnition to deal with the adversary’s extra knowledge about the correlation be-
tween anonymous events and some observables independent of the protocol. The latter
is meant to arise from an independent source such as the environment in which the pro-
tocolisexecuted.Thepapershowsthatthepresenceofextraknowledgemakesprobable
innocence more diﬃcult to achieve, and quantiﬁes such diﬃculty.
The main diﬀerence between these approaches and the one we present in this paper
is that we consider the scenario where each participant in the protocol exhibits honest
or malicious behaviours according to a ﬁxed probability. In our opinion, such a scenario
is a highly likely in ubiquitous computing. This paper is not intended to propose a new
deﬁnition of probable innocence; rather, we are interested in studying the impact on
the protocol’s security of its participants’ probabilistic behaviour. To this end, we ﬁrst
extend the scenario of attack by associating to each principal a trust level t ∈ [0,1]
denoting her robustness against corruption. We then modify the protocol accordingly;
rather, than selecting a forwarding node uniformly, the forwarding process is governed
by a policy where the probability of selecting a node depends on her trust level. We
then establish necessary and suﬃcient criteria for choosing an appropriate policy of
forwarding between members in order to achieve probable innocence. It is important to
observe that the trust levels t are parameters representing the real world, and not part of
the protocol. However, as will be made clear below, the protocol participants will need
to have estimates of them. There are well-studied distributed methods for that, based
e.g. on Bayesian analysis (cf. [14]), whilst in the current centralised implementation of
Crowds,observationleadingtotheestimationoft canbemadebythemechanismwhich
manages crowd membership, the so-called ‘blender.’ We do not cover such issues and
the related techniques in the current exposition, as we consider them largely orthogonal
and scarcely relevant to the focus of this paper.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows: in §2 we ﬁx some basic nota-
tions and recall the fundamental ideas and properties of the C protocol, including
the notion of probable innocence. In §3 we present our ﬁrst main contribution: C
protocol extended with trust information of its participating members; §4 delivers our
second main contribution by studying the anonymity provided by the extended protocol
and establishing necessary and suﬃcient conditions for achieving probable innocence.
2 Background
This section describes our conceptual framework and revises the C protocol and
its notion of probable innocence. We use capital letters A, B to denote discrete random
variables, small letters a, b and calligraphic letters A, B for their values and set of
values, respectively. We denote by P(a) the probability of a and by P(a,b) the joint
probability of a and b. The conditional probability of a given b is deﬁned as
P(a|b) =
P(a,b)
P(b)Bayes’ theorem relates the conditional probabilities P(a|b) and P(a|b) as follows
P(a|b) =
P(b|a)P(a)
P(b)
(1)
We consider a framework commonly used in probabilistic approaches to anonymity
and information ﬂow (e.g. [5,11,15,19]). This focuses on total protocols and programs
with one high level (or anonymous) input A, a random variable over a ﬁnite set A,
and one low level output (observable) O, a random variable over a ﬁnite set O. We
represent a protocol/program by the matrix of the conditional probabilities P(oj |ai),
where P(oj |ai) is the probability that the low output is oj given that the high input
is ai. We assume that the high input is generated according to an a priori publicly-
known probability distribution. An adversary or eavesdropper can see the output of a
protocol, but not the input, and she is interested in deriving the value of the input from
the observed output.
2.1 The C protocol
C is a protocol proposed by Reiter and Rubin in [16] to allow Internet users to
perform anonymous web transactions, i.e., to protect their identities as originators of
request messages. The central mechanism is that the originator forwards the message to
a randomly-selected user, which in turn forwards the message to another user, and so on
until the message reaches its destination (the end server). This routing process ensures
that when a user is detected sending a message, there is a substantial probability that
she is not acting for herself but simply forwarding it on behalf of somebody else.
More speciﬁcally, a crowd is a ﬁxed number of users participating in the protocol.
Some members (users) in the crowd may be corrupted (the attackers), and they can
collaborate in order to discover the originator’s identity. The purpose of the protocol is
to protect the identity of the message originator from the attackers. When an originator
–alsoreferredtoasinitiator–wantstocommunicatewithaserver,shecreatesarandom
path between herself and the server through the crowd by the following process.
– Initial step: the initiator selects randomly a member of the crowd (possibly herself)
and forwards the request to her. We refer to the latter user as the forwarder.
– Forwarding steps: a forwarder, upon receiving a request, ﬂips a biased coin. With
probability 1 − pf she delivers the request to the end server or, with probability
pf, she selects randomly a new forwarder (possibly herself) and relays the original
request to her, to repeat the forwarding process again.
The response from the server to the originator follows the same path in the opposite
direction. Users (including corrupted ones) are assumed to have only access to mes-
sages routed through them, so that they only know the identities of their immediate
predecessors and successors in the path, and of the destination server.
2.2 Probable innocence
In [16] Reiter and Rubin have proposed a hierarchy of anonymity notions in the context
of C. These range from ‘absolute privacy,’ where the attacker cannot perceivethe presence of communication, to ‘provably exposed,’ where the attacker can prove the
sender and receiver relationship to third parties. Clearly enough, C cannot ensure
absolute privacy in presence of attackers or corrupted users; it can only provide weaker
notions of anonymity. In particular, in [16] the authors propose an anonymity notion
called probable innocence and prove that, under suitable conditions on the parameters
of the protocol, C ensures the probable innocence property to the originator. In-
formally, they deﬁne it as follows:
A sender is probably innocent if, from the attacker’s
point of view, the sender appears no more likely to
be the originator than to not be the originator.
(2)
In other words, the attacker may have good reasons to consider the sender more likely
than any other user to be the originator, yet it still appears at least as likely that she is
not.
Let n be the number of users participating in the protocol and let c and m be the
number of the corrupted and honest users, respectively, with n = m+c. Since anonymity
makes only sense for honest users, we deﬁne the set of anonymous events as A =
{a1,a2,...,am}, where ai indicates that user i is the initiator of the message.
As it is usually the case in the analysis of C, we assume that attackers will
always deliver a request to forward immediately to the end server, since forwarding it
any further cannot help them learn anything more about the identity of the originator.
Thus in any given path, there is at most one detected user: the ﬁrst honest member to
forward the message to a corrupted member. We therefore deﬁne the set of observable
events as O = {o1,o2,...,om}, where oj indicates that user j forwarded a message to a
corrupted user. In this case we also say that user j is detected by the attacker.
Reiter and Rubin formalise their notion of probable innocence via the conditional
probability P(I |H) that the initiator is detected given that any user is detected at all.
Here H denotes the event that there is an attacker in the path (and thus the user before
it will be detected), whilst I is the event that precisely the initiator will forward the
message to the attacker.1 Probable innocence holds if P(I |H) ≤ 1/2.
In our setting the probability that user j is detected given that user i is the initiator,
can be written simply as P(oj |ai). As we are only interested in the case in which a
user is detected, for simplicity we do not write such condition explicitly. Therefore, the
notion of probable innocence proved in [16] translates in our setting as:
P(oi |ai) ≤
1
2
for all i = 1,...,m (3)
Reiter and Rubin proved in [16] that the following property holds for C.
P(oj |ai) =

    
    
1 −
m − 1
n
pf i = j
1
m
pf i , j
(4)
1 Observe that this does not necessarily mean that the attacker is the second user in the path, as
the originator could herself be selected as a forwarder in the path she initiated!Therefore, probable innocence (3) holds if and only if
m ≥
c − 1
pf − 1/2
pf .
As previously noticed in several papers (e.g., [3]), there is a mismatch between
the idea of probable innocence expressed informally in (2) and property (3) actually
proved by Reiter and Rubin. Indeed, the former seems to correspond to the following
interpretation given by Halpern and O’Neill [11]:
P(ai |oi) ≤
1
2
for all i = 1,...,m (5)
Properties (3) and (5) however coincide under the standard assumption in C
that the a priori distribution is uniform, i.e., that each honest user has equal probability
of being the initiator.
Finally we recall that the concept of probable innocence was recently generalised
in [12]. Instead of just comparing the probability of being innocent with the probability
of being guilty, loc. cit. considers, so to say, ‘degrees’ of innocence. Formally, given a
real number α ∈ [0,1], a protocol satisﬁes α-probable innocence if and only if
P(ai |oi) ≤ α for all i = 1,...,m (6)
Clearly, α-probable innocence coincides with the probable innocence for α = 1/2.
3 Using trust information
In the previous section, we have revised the fundamental ideas of the C protocol
and its properties under the assumption that each user participating in the protocol is
either always honest or always an attacker, and all members are treated equally. How-
ever, as observed in §1, this is not a realistic assumption for open and dynamic systems
in ubiquitous computing. Indeed, open and dynamic systems often use attributes related
to some level of trust to enhance security and privacy. In this section we reformulate
C under the novel scenario where interaction between users is governed by their
level of trust. We then study the eﬀect of such probabilistic principals’ behaviour on the
security of the protocol.
3.1 C protocol extended
We now extend the C protocol to take into account the trust levels of its partic-
ipating members. We associate a trust level tij ∈ [0,1] to each pair of users i and j
to indicate the trust of user i in user j according to evidence provided by j. Here tij
denotes the probability that when the principal i chooses principal j as a forwarder, j
behaves honestly and protects i’s identity. Accordingly, each user i deﬁnes her policy of
forwarding to other members (including herself) based on her trust of them. A policy
of forwarding for a user i is probability distribution {qi1,qi2,··· ,qin}, such that for all i,Pn
j=1 qij = 1. Here qij denotes the probability that j is chosen as a forwarder by i (given
that i has decided to forward the message).
Deﬁning trust as an individual judgement as we did above matches the current as-
sumptions in the research on trust (cf. [14]) and is certainly desirable in general. How-
ever for some applications – speciﬁcally the C protocol – it is more reasonable
to consider a simpliﬁed notion where trust in a user is common to everybody. In other
words tij = tkj for all i and k. Indeed, in the case of the C protocol, we want a
trust in a user to reﬂect her robustness to becoming corrupt (a.k.a. infected). Allowing
each member to adopt her own level of trust would make the value of trust subjective
and could hardly reﬂect the user’s actual robustness against corruption.
We therefore assume that a trust in a user is shared. Its value could be established
cooperatively by the members of the crowd, or by a suitable local authority (e.g., the
blender in case of Reiter and Rubin’s implementation of C) based on evidence
provided by the user. Accordingly, in the rest of the paper, we will simply write ti to
denote the trust level of user i. Similarly, we require the policy of forwarding to be
common to all members of the crowds. This means that all participants treat any given
user in the same way, as all of them have the same trust in her. We therefore write
{q1,q2,··· ,qn} to represent the common forwarding policy.
Under these assumptions, we extend the protocol. When an initiator wants to com-
municate with a server, she creates a random path between herself and the server
through the crowd by the following process.
– Initial step: With probability qj the initiator selects a member j of the crowd (pos-
sibly herself) according to the policy of forwarding {q1,q2,··· ,qn} and forwards
the request to her. We refer to the latter user as the forwarder.
– Forwarding steps: a forwarder, upon receiving a request, ﬂips a biased coin. With
probability 1 − pf she delivers the request to the end server or, with probability
pf · qk, she selects a new forwarder k (possibly herself) and relays the original
request to her, to repeat the forwarding process again.
3.2 Probable innocence revisited
In order to study the anonymity provided by the extended protocol, we ﬁrst spell out
the hypotheses of our analysis. As is the previous section, we assume that corrupted
members will always deliver a request immediately to the end server, since forwarding
it any further cannot help the attacker learn anything more about the identity of the
originator. Consequently, when an infected user initiates a transaction, her message is
delivered directly to the end server.2
We also assume that server replies are short, so that the status of each user in an
anonymous paths from users to servers is maintained for the time it takes for the reply
to travel back from server to originator. That is, we do not consider the case where users
on a given path may switch to become corrupt (or indeed honest) between request and
answer, which might happen if the server’s replies are very long or very slow. From
servers to users so which would normally follow the same paths in reverse direction.
2 Her anonymity is broken at the start, so there is no need to continue the anonymity protocol.Under these assumptions, there is always at most one corrupted member on a path, it
occupies its last position, and detection always occurs while forwarding a request and
not while relaying a reply.3
Finally since each user i has probability ti of being honest when she initiates a
request, we extend the set of anonymous events ai and observable events oi to the whole
set of participating members.
Under these assumption we study the privacy level ensured to each member par-
ticipating in the protocol, i.e., P(ai | oi). We remind the reader that by Bayes’ theorem
(Eq. 1) we have
P(ai | oi) =
P(ai,oi)
P(oi)
(7)
We ﬁrst evaluate the denominator in the above expression. Let Hk be the event that
the ﬁrst corrupted node in the message path to the server occupies the kth position,
where k ≥ 0. Note that H0 means that the initiator itself is corrupted.
P(oi,Hk) =

                   
                   
1
n
(1 − ti) k = 0
1
n
ti
n X
j=1
qj(1 − tj) k = 1
n X
j=1
1
n
tj

      
n X
j=1
qjtj

      
k−2
·
qiti
Pn
j=1 qj(1 − tj)

· pk−1
f k ≥ 2
(8)
The above equation for the case k ≥ 2 is implied by the fact that the message is initiated
by any honest participant, forwarded to k−2 honest principals before it is passed to the
detected principal i, and ﬁnally to a corrupted one. For convenience, we will write T
for
Pn
j=1 qjtj and S for
Pn
j=1 tj. Since the joint events {oi,Hk}, for k ≥ 0 are mutually
exclusive, we evaluate P(oi) as follows.
P(oi) =
∞ X
k=0
P(oi,Hk)
=
1
n
(1 − ti) +
1
n
ti(1 − T)
+
∞ X
k=2
1
n
STk−2 · qiti (1 − T) · pk−1
f
=
1
n
 
1 − tiT + S pfqiti
 
1 − T
1 − pfT
!!
(9)
3 We are currently working on a reﬁned protocol where this assumption is dropped. This means
that there can be users on a path which while not infected in the forward direction, become cor-
rupt by the time they receive the response from the server. Hence they report their predecessor
as the detected user.From Equation (9), it is worth noticing that P(oi) = 0 only if T = 1 and ti = 1. Observe
that T = 1 means that tj = 1 for all participants j where qj , 0, i.e., all forwarders are
always honest. In this case i is never detected by any forwarder. If moreover ti = 1, the
principal i is never detected by herself. Thus in the case where T = 1 and ti = 1 the
principal i is never detected by any corrupted node.
Now we turn to evaluating the probability P(ai,oi) appearing as the numerator in
Equation (7). To such purpose, we ﬁrst formulate the probability P(ai,Hk,oi), i.e., the
probability that i is the initiator and is also detected by a corrupted node at position k in
the message path.
P(ai,Hk,oi) =

                   
                   
1
n
(1 − ti) k = 0
1
n
ti
n X
j=1
qj(1 − tj) k = 1
1
n
ti

      
n X
j=1
qjtj

      
k−2
·
qiti
Pn
j=1 qj(1 − tj)

· pk−1
f k ≥ 2
(10)
Similar to the argument of Equation (8), the formula in the case k ≥ 2 is implied by the
fact that the message is initiated by the principal i, forwarded to k − 2 honest principals
before it is passed back to i, and ﬁnally to a corrupted principal. Since the joint events
{ai,Hk,oi}, for k ≥ 0 are mutually exclusive, we evaluate P(ai,oi) as follows.
P(ai,oi) =
∞ X
k=0
P(ai,Hk,oi)
=
1
n
(1 − ti) +
1
n
ti(1 − T)
+
∞ X
k=2
1
n
tiTk−2 · qiti (1 − T) · pk−1
f
=
1
n
 
1 − tiT + pfqit2
i
 
1 − T
1 − pfT
!!
(11)
Assuming P(oi) , 0, we substitute Equations (9) and (11) in Equation (7), and we
therefore get,
P(ai | oi) =
1 − tiT + pfqit2
i

1−T
1−pfT

1 − tiT + S pfqiti

1−T
1−pfT
 (12)
From Equation (12), we observe that for a detectable principal i (i.e., P(oi) , 0), it
holds that P(ai | oi) > 0. That is, there is always a non zero probability that i is the
initiator if she is detected. This conﬁrms that Crowds never achieves the highest degree
of anonymity known as absolute privacy in [16].3.3 Provably exposed principals
It would also be interesting to investigate the conditions under which the protocol can
only ensure the degree of anonymity known as provably exposed to a given principal
i. Such a degree, deﬁned in [16], represents the lowest level of anonymity where an
attacker can prove the identity of the message initiator. This happens when i is the only
possible initiator, given that i is detected, i.e., P(ai | oi) = 1. These conditions are
precisely stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Provably exposed). For all user i such that P(oi) , 0, we have that
P(ai | oi) = 1 if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
– pf = 0 ;
– ti = 0 ;
– qi = 0 ;
– T = 1 ;
– S = ti .
Proof. Solving the following equation P(ai | oi) = 1 using the formula given by Equa-
tion (12) yields only the above conditions.
The following paragraphs discuss the meaning of these results. Firstly, we observe that
pf = 0 implies that, provided she is not corrupt, the initiator will pick her ﬁrst forwarder
according to the forwarding policy {q1,··· ,qn}, who then delivers directly the message
to the end server, regardless of her being corrupt or not. Thus, in this case a path is
always at most of length 2, excluding the end server. Hence, i can only be detected at
position 0 (by herself if she is initially corrupted) or at position 1 by her forwarder when
the latter is corrupted. Therefore, in both cases, i is the only possible initiator. That is if
a principal i is detected, then she must be the initiator.
In the case where ti = 0, i is always corrupted and therefore when she initiates a
message, she will detect herself and deliver the message directly to the end server (by
assumption). Hence nobody except herself will detect her, and i will be detected if and
only if she is the initiator.
Consider the case where qi = 0. This implies that i is never chosen as a forwarder.
In this case, i is detected only if she initiates a message and is corrupted at the same
time, i.e., she detects herself. Thus, the detection of i implies that i is the initiator.
The case T = 1 happens if and only if tj = 1 for all qj , 0, which means that only
honest members can be chosen as forwarders. In this case too, i is detected only if she
originates a message and is corrupted at the same time: she detects herself. Thus, the
fact that i is detected, implies that i is the initiator.
Finally, suppose that S = ti. Here tj = 0 for all j , i, that is all participants other
than i are corrupted. In this case if i is detected then it is the only possible initiator
because otherwise the initiator would just detect herself at the start of the protocol.
Therefore, once again, if i is detected, she must be the initiator.
It is worth noticing that the original C protocol is the protocol obtained by
assuming that each principal i is either always honest or always corrupted, i.e., ti ∈{0,1}, and by choosing a uniform forwarding policy, that is for all j,
qj =
1
n
.
Thus when the number of corrupted principals is c, we have
T =
n X
j=1
qjtj =
n − c
n
,
and
S =
n X
j=1
tj = n − c .
By substituting the values of qj, T and S in Equation (12) for a honest initiator i, i.e.,
one for which ti = 1, we get
P(ai | oi) = 1 − pf
 
n − c − 1
n
!
.
which is the same expression derived in [16] for standard C and given by (4).
4 Achieving probable innocence
For any ﬁxed number of principals n, the extended protocol described in the previous
section has three main parameters: the forwarding probability pf, members’ trust values
{t1,··· ,tn}, and the forwarding policy {q1,··· ,qn}. We study in this section how each
of them aﬀect the anonymity of participating members. We begin by the probability of
forwarding.
4.1 Probability of forwarding
The following result states that for ﬁxed trust values {t1,··· ,tn} and forwarding policy
{q1,··· ,qn}, the probability P(ai | oi) for any participant i is a monotonically decreasing
function with respect to the forwarding probability pf.
Theorem 1 (Monotonicity). For all i = 1,...,n,
∂P(ai | oi)
∂pf
≤ 0
Proof. By diﬀerentiating P(ai | oi) as given by Equation (12) with respect to pf, we
have
∂P(ai | oi)
∂pf
=
ti qi (1 − T)(1 − tiT)(ti − S)

(1 − pfT)(1 − tiT) + pfSqiti(1 − T)
2 . (13)
Given that 0 ≤ tj ≤ 1 for each principal j, and that T =
Pn
j=1 qjtj, we have 0 ≤ T ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ tiT ≤ 1. We have also ti ≤ S, because S =
Pn
j=1 tj, and therefore
∂P(ai | oi)
∂pf
≤ 0 ,
i.e., P(ai | oi) is either ﬁxed or decreasing with respect to pf.From Equation (13) above, P(ai | oi) is ﬁxed irrespectively of pf if and only if i
is always corrupted (ti = 0), i is never used as a forwarder (qi = 0), all forwarders are
honest (T = 1), or all participants other than i are corrupted (S = ti). It has been shown
by Proposition 1 in the previous section that P(ai | oi) = 1 in these cases.
Theorem 1 justiﬁes using a high value of pf as it decreases the probability of identi-
fying the initiator and therefore enhance her privacy. However, large pf implies longer
message path to the server, and therefore the performance of the protocol is degraded.
Thus a trade-oﬀ is required for choosing the forwarding probability pf.
Corollary 1 (Anonymity range). For all i = 1,...,n,
1 ≥ P(ai | oi) ≥ 1 −
qiti
Pn
j,i tj
1 − ti
Pn
j,i qjtj + qiti
Pn
j,i tj
Proof. By Theorem 1, and taking into account that 0 ≤ pf ≤ 1, the above range for
P(ai | oi) is obtained by substituting pf = 0 and pf = 1 in Equation (12).
The corollary above describes the range of probabilities that a principal i is the ini-
tiator given that i is detected. Observe that with pf = 0 the message is passed directly
to the server, and therefore if i is detected, then she must be the initiator and also de-
tected by herself. Taking pf = 1 minimises P(ai | oi), but in this case the message never
reaches the server.
4.2 Trust values
We now turn our focus to the trust values. Observe that the anonymity of a member i,
indicated by P(ai | oi), is aﬀected by the trust values tj of all participating members.
Therefore, the above lower bound can be used as a criterion to decide whether a new
member i is accepted to join the network or not based on her trust ti. For instance, such a
criterion can be chosen to achieve the α-probable innocence according to the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (α-probable innocence). Let α ∈ [0,1] be a positive value. If for all i =
1,...,n
qiti
Pn
j,i tj
1 − ti
Pn
j,i qjtj + qiti
Pn
j,i tj
≥ 1 − α ,
then the extended protocol ensures α-probable innocence to all its participating mem-
bers.
Proof. Results from Corollary 1 and Deﬁnition 6.
4.3 Forwarding policy.
We now propose a strategy for choosing a forwarding policy {q1,··· ,qn} based on the
trustinformation{t1,··· ,tn}inordertoachieveα-probableinnocenceforagivendegreeof privacy α. The key idea is that the forwarding probabilities qj are adjusted depending
on the given trust information tj.
Choosing the forwarding policy qi for a given user i can then be done by main-
taining the lower bounds of P(ai | oi) below a chosen threshold α, i.e., by achieving
α-probable innocence. By Theorem 2 the plausible values of qi are obtained by solving
the following system of linear inequalities.
1 − α ≤
qiti
Pn
j,i tj
1 − ti
Pn
j,i qjtj + qiti
Pn
j,i tj
1 ≤ i ≤ n
1 =
n X
i=1
qi
Example 1. Consider an instance of Crowds-Trust protocol where three principals are
involved. Let the trust values in these principals be:
t1 = 0.70, t2 = 0.97, t3 = 0.99
Solving the above problem for α = 1
2 yields the two solutions:
0.2479 ≤ q2 ≤ 0.2620
1.1411 − 3.4138q2 ≤ q3 ≤ 0.5479 − 1.0206q2
q1 = 1 − q2 − q3
and
0.2620 ≤ q2 ≤ 0.3074
0.3197 − 0.2784q2 ≤ q3 ≤ 0.5479 − 1.0206q2
q1 = 1 − q2 − q3 .
Thus the following forwarding distribution satisﬁes the 1
2-probable innocence:
q1 = 0.4575, q2 = 0.2620, q3 = 0.2805 .
However, if the uniform distribution is used (as in the original Crowds protocol), i.e.,
q1 = q2 = q3 = 1
3, probable innocence is not achievable because according to Corollary
1 the minimum value of P(a1 | o1) is 0.543, which is greater than 1
2. Note that such sets
of constraints are not always solvable, in which case the required level of anonymity
cannot be provided to all members.
Observe that the forwarding distribution above increases the frequency at which the
less reliable user 1 will be involved in a message path, so as to make it more diﬃcult
for an attacker to detect her with a high degree of conﬁdence. The higher security for 1
is of course achieved at the price of a lower overall security for other two, more reliable
users, and can therefore considered a ‘social’ approach to crowds membership. The
ﬂexibility of the protocol means that the forwarding policy can be chosen to provide a
lower degree of anonymity to a subset of the members to guarantee probable innocence
to a larger crowd (‘social strategy’), or to reject principals having the low trust values
who, therefore, exhibit a greater threat to others (‘rational strategy’).5 Conclusion
In this paper we focused on the C anonymity protocol and asked the question of
how its existing analyses are aﬀected by postulating that each principal behaves hon-
estly or becomes corrupt according to a given probability (as opposed to being either
honest or malicious once and for all). This amounts to providing each member i of the
crowd with a trust level ti denoting her robustness against corruption, and a preference
level of forwarding qi denoting the probability of choosing her as the next forwarder in
the routing process. Given a probability of forwarding pf, a level of anonymity α, and
the trust levels t1,t2,··· ,tn of the crowd’s members, we have identiﬁed the conditions
on the probability of choosing a forwarder which are necessary to achieve α-probable
innocence. Thus, in presence of untrusted members, the protocol users can exploit these
results to derive an interaction policy q1,q2,··· ,qn, if any exists, that guarantees a sat-
isfactory level of anonymity; and in doing so, they can act both ‘rationally’ or ‘socially.’
In conclusion, we remark that although the scenario in which members participating
in a protocol can exhibit probabilistic behaviours is highly likely in real-world scenar-
ios, this is the ﬁrst paper to deal with the question in the context of anonymity protocols.
In the near future, we expect to tackle even more interesting scenarios, in particular by
extending this work to the case where a possibly slow or long response from the server
may follow in the reverse direction to the initiator, as the honesty status of the users on
the path has changed since the request was forwarded to the server.
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